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EMPIRE AND TRANS - IMPERIAL
SUBJECTS IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY MUSLIM MEDITERRANEAN*
GAV IN MURRA Y -M I L L ER Q1
Cardiff University
A B S T R A C T . During the nineteenth century, the Muslim Mediterranean became a locus of compet-
ing imperial projects led by the Ottomans and European powers. This article examines how the migra-
tion of people and ideas across North Africa and Asia complicated processes of imperial consolidation
and exposed the ways in which North Africa, Europe, and Asia were connected through trans-imper-
ial inﬂuences that often undermined the jurisdictional sovereignty of imperial states. It demonstrates
that cross-border migrations and cultural transfers both frustrated and abetted imperial projects while
allowing for the imagining of new types of solidarities that transcended national and imperial cate-
gorizations. In analysing these factors, this article argues for a rethinking of the metropole–periphery
relationship by highlighting the important role print and trans-imperial networks played in shaping
the Mediterranean region.
I
In , French authorities in Tunisia took an interest in one Mahmoud Zeki.
Only twenty-eight years of age, Zeki had already managed to establish a small
but not insigniﬁcant reputation for himself in the eastern Mediterranean
region. In Cairo, he had run a series of newspapers which drew the ire of
British colonial authorities. After being expelled from Egypt, he migrated to
Tunisia before moving on to Tripolitania in , where he spoke out
against the French colonial system. By the following year, Zeki was in Istanbul
running a bi-weekly newspaper entitled The Ottoman Star with a mixed editorial
staff of Arabs and Turks. According to French authorities, the paper was favour-
able to the Ottoman Empire and Sultan Abdülhamid’s brand of Pan-Islamism.
More alarming was the fact that the paper carried a broad spread of stories
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
covering the Maghreb, signalling it might be an organ for disseminating
Ottoman inﬂuence across North Africa. Suspicious of these activities, French
ofﬁcials forbade Zeki re-entry into Tunisia in the spring of  in light of
his recent accusations in print that the Tunisian protectorate was ‘interfering
with the principles of the Muslim religion’.
What makes Zeki’s story noteworthy is not its unique or exceptional charac-
ter. On the contrary, it is its ubiquitous quality that is informative. Colonial
and ministerial archives are ﬁlled with accounts of itinerant Muslims who at
one time or another piqued the interests of colonial authorities. Their peregri-
nations across imperial borders no less than their political temperaments were
suspect in an age of ﬁerce imperial rivalries and consolidation. The
Mediterranean world through which Zeki and others circulated was an imperial
space, but it was also one that resisted the very practices and sensibilities that
guided empire-building in the nineteenth century. Efforts to demarcate
borders and enforce territorial boundaries were part and parcel of the imperial
project, especially following the Berlin Conference of , which required
powers to demonstrate ‘effective occupation’ in order to lay claim to territory.
These practices, formalized in international law, were representative of the
‘simple’ space that informed European imperial imaginaries in the period of
high imperialism. Yet beneath the homogeneous, abstract space of formal
empire always lurked the ‘gothic complex space’ of indigenous societies with
their overlapping identities and trans-local attachments, a factor made
evident in Zeki’s imperial border-hopping.
Imperium, designating ‘command’ or ‘power’, has always connoted a measure
of control over a people or territory. This deﬁnition is revealing given that
empires have traditionally been treated as bounded sovereign entities with
more-or-less ﬁxed borders and jurisdictions. From at least the eighteenth
century onwards, regimes endeavoured to consolidate their power by drawing
borders and redirecting loyalties toward imperial centres. In many respects,
empire necessitated categories of spatial and social ﬁxity. Yet this impression
of stability adhered more to the colour-coded maps that were produced by
imperial powers – maps with sharp lines and rigidly deﬁned borders – than to
the actualities of rule as it occurred on the ground. Recent appraisals have
revised long-held assumptions regarding the nature of empire-building in the
 Archives Nationales de Tunisie (ANT), E , dossier /, ‘Secrétariat Général: Bureau de
la comptabilité’,  May .
 ANT, E , dossier /, ‘Note: A. S. du journal L’Étoile ottomane’,  May .
 For concepts of ‘simple’ and ‘gothic’ space, see John Milbank, ‘Against the resignations of
the age’, in Francis P. McHugh and Samuel M. Natale, eds., Things old and things new: Catholic
social teaching revisited (New York, NY, ), p. .
 Anthony Pagden, ‘Fellow citizens and imperial subjects: conquest and sovereignty in
Europe’s overseas empires’, History and Theory,  (), pp. –.
 Matthew Edney, Mapping an empire: the geographical construction of British India, –
(Chicago, IL, ); Morag Bell, Robin Butli, and Michael Heffernan, eds., Geography and
imperialism, – (Manchester, ).
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modern period. Whereas previous models focused on conquest and top-down
state policies, new scholarship has indicated the important role that migratory
patterns, missionaries, merchants, and cross-border communities alike played
in the construction of global empires. Empire-building was shaped by pressures
from below that would inﬂuence imperial polities as well as modern ideas of citi-
zenship and cultural identity. By examining the activities of trans-imperial sub-
jects like merchants and migrants, historians have not only demonstrated the
ﬂuidity of borders, but also the ways in which individuals and groups negotiated
their own conceptions of belonging at the margins of empires. In a broader
context, examining movements and communities that cut across borders
opens the possibility of analysing new types of solidarities that transcend conven-
tional frameworks of national or imperial space. It situates individuals around a
range of relational principles rooted in networks, cultural ties, and ideologies
that have the potential to remap and reposition familiar geographies.
The nineteenth-century Muslim Mediterranean provides a context for
engaging with the connected histories of empire across Africa, Europe, and
Asia. While processes of modern state formation were well underway in the
Mediterranean by mid-century, the region remained a borderland character-
ized by migratory movements and a remarkable internal diversity. Modern
state and imperial formations were often superimposed over pre-existing com-
mercial and social networks running from the Atlantic coast to South Asia and
beyond. European attempts to establish jurisdiction along the southern and
eastern Mediterranean littoral had to contend with these actualities.
Territorialization in a strict sense proved difﬁcult to enforce, not least of all
because much of North Africa had once been nominally part of the Ottoman
Empire. Muslim subjects retained social and cultural ties with Istanbul and
the Ottoman Near East well after European rule was introduced. In carving
out African empires and protectorates, therefore, European powers had to
impose control – imperium in the most literal sense of the word – over a
mobile Islamic population with ties and loyalties that resisted the type of
bounded sovereignty commanded by an imperial state. This was no less true
of the Ottoman Empire, which was occupied with centralizing imperial
 Ella Natalie Rothman, Brokering empire: trans-imperial subjects between Venice and Istanbul
(Ithaca, NY, ); James H. Meyer, Turks across empires: marketing Muslim identity in the
Russian-Ottoman borderland, – (Oxford, ); Resat Kasaba, A moveable empire:
Ottoman nomads, migrants and refugees (Seattle, WA, ).
 Seema Alavi,Muslim cosmopolitanism in the age of empire (Cambridge, MA, ), pp. –.
 David Harvey, Cosmopolitanism and the geographies of freedom (New York, NY, ), p. .
 Julia A. Clancy-Smith, Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an age of migration, –
 (Berkeley, CA, ); Ilham Khuri-Makdisi, The eastern Mediterranean and the making of
global radicalism, – (Berkley, CA, ); Edmund Burke III, ‘Toward a comparative
history of the modern Mediterranean, –’, Journal of World History,  (),
pp. –.
EM P I R E A N D T R A N S - I M P E R I A L S U B J E C T S
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
authority and integrating a complex mosaic of multi-ethnic provinces and fron-
tier regions into the state.
If trans-imperial ﬂows proved disruptive to state-building projects, imperial
governments nonetheless found ways of pressing them into service. In addition
to state actors, local elites and activists could and frequently did harness net-
works for their own ends, in many instances fostering political and social move-
ments with the potential for cross-border mobilization. These various spheres of
activity suggest that the age of empire also reconﬁgured traditional networks
and infused them with new cultural and political meaning. Aided by innovations
in global print culture, imperial subjects from Algeria to India were able to
frame broad political platforms that reimagined the bounds of their respective
communities. More provocatively, the synergies engendered by print media,
religious networks, and anti-colonial protest had the potential to foster collect-
ive responses to regional events and empower publics. During the Libyan and
Balkan Wars of –, trans-imperial networks played a vital role in mobiliz-
ing opinion and organizing voluntary aid associations across imperial frontiers.
These activities marked an early chapter in the history of modern humanitarian-
ism as traditional networks converged with new media and ﬁnancial networks to
‘mobilize empathy’ for both charitable and political ends.
Understanding these trans-imperial dynamics and how they functioned ultim-
ately outlines a novel analytical framework for the study of empire. It replaces
the familiar metropole–periphery relationship with a constellation of compet-
ing metropoles and peripheries, emphasizing the convergence of localized pol-
itical, economic, and social processes born from imperial rivalry and
contestation. While such a model may appear to diverge from traditional top-
down histories of empire, it is important to recognize that trans-imperial cur-
rents were never completely divorced from processes of empire-building. In
certain instances, they were integral to it. Although states attempted to discip-
line cross-border ﬂows, they also exploited and even encouraged them when
it served their interests. The nineteenth century marked a critical moment in
the ‘re-spatialization’ of the Mediterranean as powers attempted to carve out
and consolidate imperial states. Empire-building and resistance were two
parts of a dialectical process. Rather than favouring perspectives from
‘above’ or ‘below’, therefore, the Muslim Mediterranean reveals the need for
 Cem Emrence, Remapping the Ottoman Middle East: modernity, imperial bureaucracy and Islam
(London, ); Selim Deringil, The well-protected domains: ideology and the legitimation of power in
the Ottoman Empire, – (London, ).
 Isabel Hofmeyer, Gandhi’s printing press: experiments in slow reading (Cambridge, MA,
); James L. Gelvin and Nile Green, eds., Global Muslims in the age of steam and print
(Berkeley, CA, ).
 Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Brown, ‘Introduction’, Humanitarianism and suffer-
ing: the mobilization of empathy (Cambridge, ), pp. –.
 Matthias Middell and Katja Naumann, ‘Global history and the spatial turn: from the
impact of area studies to the study of critical junctures of globalization’, Journal of Global
History,  (), pp. –.
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a more complex understanding of how pressures from above and below inter-
acted with one another and how these twin processes simultaneously accommo-
dated and challenged prevailing notions of sovereignty in the modern period.
I I
North Africa came under European rule in progressive stages during the long
nineteenth century. By the outbreak of the First World War, France was in pos-
session of a large and primarily Arabo-Berber Muslim empire stretching across
Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. Britain had established a protectorate in Egypt
in the s, while Italy, largely for reasons of prestige, attempted to carve out a
colony in Libya after . By , the terrain of North Africa, once nominally
contained within the Ottoman Empire, had been completely transformed. This
great power perspective tends, however, to compartmentalize the various terri-
tories of the region into insulated imperial enclaves. It conceals the fact that the
Muslim Mediterranean was a mobile and interconnected world.
Muslim elites were connected through a variety of cultural and social institu-
tions that spanned continents. Religious scholars (‘ulamā) attended leading
centres of Islamic learning such as al-Qarawiyyin in Fez and al-Azhar in Cairo,
and typically maintained relations with elites across Africa and the greater
Middle East after receiving their education. In tandem with established reli-
gious scholars, Suﬁ networks also linked localities through afﬁliated lodges
and spiritual centres (zāwiya). Those initiated into a speciﬁc tariqa (order) trav-
elled between centres and beneﬁted from the schools and mosques run by
respective orders. Some of these tariqa, like the Naqshbandiyya and
Qadiriyya, had a substantial scope of action extending from subcontinental
Asia to Morocco and often intersecting with lucrative commercial and
caravan routes tied to the Indian Ocean. Religious pilgrimage, most signiﬁ-
cantly the annual hajj, similarly served to connect peripheral regions to
Islamic centres. Cairo was a popular stopping place for North African pilgrims
heading to Mecca, and typically a visit to Istanbul completed the itinerary.
As imperial states attempted to consolidate their power throughout the
region, cities such as Cairo, Tunis, Istanbul, and Mecca became more than
nodal points within a familiar social and cultural geography. These urban
centres were transformed into sites of trans-imperial entanglements that
 Mustafa Tuna, Imperial Russia’s Muslims: Islam, empire and European modernity, –
(Cambridge, ), pp. –.
 B. G. Martin, Muslim brotherhoods in nineteenth-century Africa (Cambridge, ).
 Butrus Abu-Manneh, ‘The Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya in the Ottoman lands in the
early nineteenth century’, Die Welt des Islams,  (), pp. –; Ira M. Lapidus, Islamic soci-
eties to the nineteenth century: a global history (Cambridge, ), pp. –; Anne K. Bang, Islamic
Suﬁ networks in the Western Indian Ocean (c. –): ripples of reform (Leiden, ); Niles
Green, Suﬁsm: a global history (Oxford, ).
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infused older networks and cultural activities with new political meanings.
Numerous studies have highlighted how imperial powers intervened in and
even ‘colonized’ the hajj for varying reasons of security and proﬁtmaking
during the nineteenth century. More recently, it has been noted that the
Ottoman Empire likewise managed pilgrimage routes and monitored travellers
for political ends. In many instances, European surveillance was a response to
the perceived dangers of Islamic radicalism and anti-colonial resistance. British
authorities kept abreast of Indian Muslims who left the subcontinent for Mecca
and subsequently relocated to the Hijaz, Egypt, and Istanbul where they disse-
minated anti-imperialist ideologies. French ofﬁcials equally monitored pil-
grims, and even introduced a more stringent passport system in the s to
assuage fears of Algerians and Tunisians being radicalized abroad.
French authorities were particularly sensitive to the trans-border connections
binding Islamic societies. As they conquered and occupied Algeria between
 and , the French military waged a gruelling war against native resist-
ance movements led by local Suﬁ leaders aided from Morocco. Given this
experience, French colonial administrators consistently portrayed Suﬁ orders
as well-organized and politically subversive organizations capable of mobilizing
wide-scale resistance at a moment’s notice. As a rule, ofﬁcials remained suspicious
of the ‘foreign’ connections Maghrebi Suﬁs maintained. In , Louis Rinn,
chief of the Native Affairs service in Algeria, pressed for heavier surveillance of the
zawāyā, adding it would be ‘advantageous’ to keep records on the foreign stu-
dents attending these religious schools. On his instructions, lists were drawn
up by the sub-prefects including information on students’ place of origin,
arrival date in Algeria, and putative ‘inﬂuence’ in the localities.The foreign ele-
ments attributed to the tariqa highlighted the perceived vulnerability of an
 Alavi, Muslim cosmopolitanism, pp. , –.
 Eileen Kane, Russian hajj: empire and the pilgrimage to Mecca (Ithaca, NY, ), pp. –;
Michael Christopher Low, ‘Empire and the hajj: pilgrims, plagues and Pan-Islam under
British surveillance, –’, International Journal of Middle East Studies,  (),
pp. –; Nile Green, ‘The hajj and its own undoing: infrastructure and integration on the
Muslim journey to Mecca’, Past and Present,  (), pp. –.
 Lâle Can, ‘Connecting people: a Central Asia Suﬁ network in turn-of-the-century
Istanbul’, Modern Asian Studies,  (), pp. –.
 Low, ‘Empire and the hajj’, p. .
 See Archives Nationales d’Outre-Mer, Aix-en-Provence (ANOM), F/, ‘Instruction
concernant le pélerinage de la Mecque’ (); ANT, A  bis, dossier , ‘Circulaire aux
contrôleurs civils: pélerinage de la Mecque’,  Mar. .
 Amira K. Bennison, Jihad and its interpretations in pre-colonial Morocco: state–society relations
during the French conquest of Algeria (London, ); James McDougall, A history of Algeria
(Cambridge, ), pp. –.
 George R. Trumbull III, An empire of facts: colonial power, cultural knowledge and Islam in
Algeria, – (Cambridge, ), pp. –; Jean-Louis Triaud, La légende noire de la
Sanûsiyya: une confrérie musulmane saharienne sous le regard français (–) (Paris, ).
 ANOM, Alger/U/, Louis Rinn to the prefects of Algiers,  Nov. .
 ANOM, Alger/U/, ‘Circulaire aux sous-préfets, administrateurs et maires’,  Nov.
.
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Algerian colony situated at the nexus of trans-regional Islamic religious and pol-
itical inﬂuences. It similarly exposed deep-seated anxieties over the diffuse and
de-centred character of Muslim social relations, anxieties that persistently crept
into French and European policy outlooks throughout the period.
Contrary to expectations, French efforts to control Muslim cultural institu-
tions occasionally provoked, rather than inhibited, cross-border movement. A
small contingent of Algerians and Tunisians joined existing communities
abroad in Tripoli, Egypt, Istanbul, and most prominently Syria from the
s onward. These émigré communities retained commercial and familial
connections with their home regions that generated points of conﬂict
between French and Ottoman authorities on numerous occasions. Under the
capitulatory legal regime applied within Ottoman territories, European
consuls could extend legal ‘protection’ to Christians and Muslim clients,
exempting them from Ottoman laws and taxation. Wary that Europeans
would use protégés to expand their inﬂuence, Ottoman statesmen proposed rec-
ognizing subjects through ‘national’ criteria over more traditional forms of reli-
gious identiﬁcation in order to clarify the position of Muslims originating from
European protectorates outside the empire. Stamping fellow Muslims with
national difference was a responsive strategy intended to restrict the prerogative
of European consuls and reinforce Ottoman imperial sovereignty. To say the
least, European authorities were reluctant to oblige.
The complex legal regimes in Ottoman territories became battlegrounds for
jurisdictional control over subjects. Yet if they favoured European encroach-
ment within the Ottoman Empire, these arrangements could also pose pro-
blems in European protectorates where capitulatory laws remained in place.
As Mary Dewhurst-Lewis has shown in her study of French Tunisia, Algerians
arriving in the regency were able to claim French status under the law and
evade the repressive Code de l’indigénat they were subject to in Algeria. This pro-
spect entitled them to equal civil rights with Europeans and set a dangerous pre-
cedent with regard to the hierarchies ordering colonial society. Entering
Tunisia, Algerians ‘escaped everything’ and enjoyed ‘an individual liberty
without restriction’, complained the resident-general Justin Massicault. In
Syria, Algerians similarly attempted to skirt taxes and conscription owed to
the Ottoman state by virtue of claiming French exemption under the law.
 John Ferris, ‘The internationalism of Islam: the British perception of a Muslim menace,
–’, Intelligence and National Security,  (), pp. –; Edmund Burke III, The
ethnographic state: France and the invention of Moroccan Islam (Berkeley, CA, ), pp. –.
 Will Hanley, ‘What Ottoman nationality was and was not’, Journal of the Ottoman and
Turkish Studies Association,  (), pp. –; Lâle Can, ‘The protection question:
Central Asians and extraterritoriality in the Late Ottoman Empire’, International Journal of
Middle East Studies,  (), pp. –.
 Mary Dewhurst-Lewis, Divided rule: sovereignty and empire in French Tunisia, –
(Berkeley, CA, ).
 Archive Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, La Courneuve (AMAE), Tunisie NS ,
Massicault to minister of foreign affairs,  Apr. .
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Ottoman authorities continually wrangled with French consular ofﬁcials over
the ambiguous status of émigrés, with each seeking to claim them as their
own.
Disputes over personal legal status underscored the thorny issues that trans-
imperial subjects provoked and occasionally produced unexpected scenarios
involving multiple regions. The demands of Sheikh Mustafa Sellaoui, a native
of Tuat residing in Tunis in , were telling in this respect. Tuat, an oasis
outpost located along the trans-Saharan trade route running south of French
Algeria, was nominally under the control of the Moroccan sultan at this time.
As the recognized head of a Moroccan émigré community in Tunis, Sellaoui
had been invested by the bey of Tunis with protégé status, permitting him to
demand taxes from the émigrés under his charge and to lay claim to authority
in Tuat. Sellaoui was clearly using his protégé status to enrich himself and
extend his personal power, a fact that the Tuatine émigré community well
understood. Refusing to pay the taxes demanded of them, the Moroccans
under Sellaoui’s charge assassinated the sheikh in the streets of Tunis in
 following a heated dispute. The fact that a Moroccan subject residing
in Tunisia was claiming jurisdiction over an area that would soon be annexed
to French Algeria testiﬁed to the often byzantine relationships that spanned
the domains of North Africa’s regional powers in the late nineteenth century.
Émigré communities like those established in Syria or Tunisia straddled
imperial borders, and in doing so connected neighbouring imperial powers
in ways that exposed the porous nature of those very borders. Naturally,
regional powers were not above exploiting trans-imperial links if it was in
their interest to do so. French consular ofﬁcials in Damascus noted the potential
value émigrés in Syria could offer and advised providing aid to inﬂuential emirs
in paving the way for a future protectorate. Conversely, Ottoman authorities
used the Algerian emigration to court Muslim loyalties and reafﬁrm the
empire’s status as a protector of Muslims. Suﬁ networks and ethnic Turkish
communities in French colonies provided conduits through which émigré
letters extolling the sultan’s generosity and favourable treatment circulated.
French ofﬁcials saw these communications for what they were, noting the
close relationship between the Ottoman government and the agence d’emigration
based in Damascus. Émigré activities were organized by the Syrian vilayet via
Tunis, where agents on the ground assisted with disseminating propaganda
 Pierre Bardin, Algeriens et Tunisiens dans l’Empire Ottoman de  à  (Paris, ),
pp. –; Allan Christelow, Algerians without borders: the making of a global frontier society
(Gainesville, FL, ), pp. –.
 AMAE, Tunisie, NS , Massicault to minister of foreign affairs,  Feb. ; Spuller,
minister of foreign affairs to Gaston, minister of France in Tangier,  Mar. .
 AMAE, Tunisie, NS , Blondel to minister of foreign affairs,  June .
 ANOM, GGA/H/, ‘Consul général, chargé du consulat de France à Damas à
M. Cruppi, Ministre des affaires etrangères’,  Mar. .
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across the Algerian frontier and coordinating travel arrangement for prospect-
ive migrants.
These details illustrated the complex and often contradictory nature of
empire-building in the Mediterranean. Cross-border networks and social ties
frustrated jurisdictional authority at every turn, prompting ofﬁcials to elaborate
evermore reﬁned legal and national criteria in identifying subjects. Yet as states
attempted to consolidate control and push out imperial rivals, they pressed
trans-local networks and migrants into service. Empire adapted to the political
and social landscape of the region, imposing itself on the dense web of connec-
tions linking Africa with the Ottoman world and, in certain instances, generat-
ing new ﬂows that imperial authorities did not hesitate to exploit.
I I I
Efforts to control and instrumentalize migratory ﬂows accompanied more ideo-
logically oriented strategies as well that relied upon different forms of cross-
border movement and communication. For instance, Ottoman involvement
in émigré politics was consistent with the general turn toward Pan-Islamism
by Sultan Abdülhamid in the s. Part diplomatic strategy and part domestic
policy, Ottoman Pan-Islamism sought to rally the global Muslim community
behind the symbol of the Islamic Caliphate and provide a new basis of social
unity and legitimacy for Abdülhamid’s declining empire. By encouraging
Muslims to look to Istanbul, the sultan intended to overcome his diplomatic iso-
lation among the European powers and curb the aggressive Western imperial-
ism that threatened the very existence of the Ottoman state. ‘We must
strengthen our links with the Muslims of other lands and get closer to each
other’, Abdülhamid urged his coreligionists. ‘The only hope for our future
lies in this idea.’ Outside the symbolic gestures and rhetoric of Muslim
unity, Abdülhamid endeavoured to harness Suﬁ structures to his Pan-Islamic
agenda and tap into the networks that cut across Africa and Asia. As channels
for inﬂuencing and mobilizing Muslim subjects, Suﬁ networks were envisaged
as a potential mechanism for exerting power at the local levels of society.
Abroad, they could serve as an arm of Ottoman foreign policy against
European encroachment in places such as Libya and the Arabian Peninsula,
and potentially exert pressure on Britain in India.
 ANOM, GGA/H/, ‘Emigration en Syrie: Rapport Varnier’ ().
 Deringil, The well-protected domains; Kamal H. Karpat, The politicization of Islam: reconstructing
identity, state, faith and community in the late Ottoman state (Oxford, ), pp. –.
 Azim Özcan, Pan-Islamism: Indian Muslims, the Ottomans and Britain (–) (Leiden,
), p. .
 Jacob M. Landau, The politics of Pan-Islamism: ideology and organization (Oxford, ),
pp. –; Brian Silverstein, ‘Suﬁsm and govermentality in the late Ottoman Empire’,
Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East,  (), pp. –; Mostafa
Minawi, The Ottoman Scramble for Africa: empire and diplomacy in the Sahara and the Hijaz
(Stanford, CA, ).
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While Abdülhamid’s policies instrumentalized traditional Muslim social and
religious structures, the message employed in doing so was quite novel and
spoke to evolving cultural and ideological currents prevalent among Muslim
intellectuals of the period. Pan-Islamism was hardly a homogeneous movement
directed from Istanbul, and in fact sprang from a variety of sources and diver-
gent aspirations. Calls to Muslim unity (Ittihād-i Islām) possessed anti-colonial
overtones, but also spoke to broad social and political concerns of the day,
ﬂuctuating between ‘cultural’ and ‘political’ expression of Islamic solidarity
as warranted. Confronted with the imposition of modern secular institutions
and the ever-present threat of European colonialism, Muslim elites grappled
with questions of how to preserve Islamic identity and culture and in what
measure. From its origins as a popular revivalist movement, Pan-Islamism regis-
tered with an array of Muslim elites across borders. It was based in shared con-
cerns over tradition and how to make Muslim society compatible with the
cultural and political forms of modernity. According to Cemil Aydin, Pan-
Islamismmarked a collective effort on the part of Muslim reformers to construct
a transnational identity with the power to mobilize communities and inﬂuence
modernist movements beyond the nation. It grew out of the loose-knit net-
works that traditionally connected Muslim societies and provided a context in
which reform-minded elites could reimagine these social and cultural bonds
through articulations of a shared Islamic cultural identity and ‘Muslim
cosmopolitanism’.
The popular reception of the unity movement had much to do with its forms
of transmission. Muslim elites enthusiastically adopted the new printing tech-
nologies and methods of dissemination coming from the West, promoting
their views in a range of newspapers and pamphlets. The print revolution effect-
ively broke the monopoly of the ‘ulamā on authoritative knowledge and reli-
gious discourse and armed reformers with a modern style press that could
reach larger audiences. Innovations in print helped construct the very idea
of a ‘Muslim world’ distinct from religiously based understandings of the
ummah. More importantly, it was through journals and print culture that
expatriate Muslim communities were kept globally connected. A new Islamic
public sphere emerged in which both publications and elites circulated in
 Adeeb Khalid, ‘Pan-Islamism in practice: the rhetoric of Muslim unity and its uses’, in
Elisabeth Özdalga, ed., Late Ottoman society: the intellectual legacy (London, ), pp. –;
Bernard Lewis, The emergence of modern Turkey (London, ), pp. –.
 Karpat, The politicization of Islam, pp. –.
 Cemil Aydin, The politics of anti-Westernism in Asia: vision of world order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-
Asian thought (New York, NY, ), pp. –.
 Alavi, Muslim cosmopolitanism, pp. –.
 Francis Robinson, ‘Technology and religious change: Islam and the impact of print’,
Modern Asian Studies,  (), pp. –; Adeeb Khalid, ‘Printing, publishing and reform
in tsarist Central Asia’, International Journal of Middle East Studies,  (), pp. –.
 Cemil Aydin, The idea of the Muslim world: a global intellectual history (Cambridge, MA, ),
pp. , –.
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greater numbers. Public Pan-Islamism or ‘Muslim cosmopolitanism’ was part
of this development. It acquired saliency through the new forms of communica-
tion and sociability growing up in places like Istanbul, Cairo, and Beirut, and
attested to the dynamism of a trans-imperial Muslim public sphere.
Texts migrated across expires. Merchants and the middle classes in Fez,
Tangiers, and Rabat were avid readers of Arabic newspapers coming from
Egypt and the Near East, as indicated by the high subscription rates in
Morocco. Colonial authorities in Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt kept abreast of
foreign newspapers and publications that entered their territories on a
regular basis, commonly viewing them as vehicles of Muslim radicalization. A
bookstore in the Tunis medina was singled out by French police when it was
found selling translations of the Ottoman writer Namik Kemal’s poem ‘Voice
of liberty and the patrie’, a work believed to be exercising a pernicious
inﬂuence on Tunisian students. If this observation was insipid, the book itself
is a remarkable artefact. Penned in Anatolia, translated into Arabic in Syria,
published in Beirut, and sold on the streets of Tunis, ‘Voice of liberty’ was
one of the many migrating texts that circulated through the Mediterranean
at this time. In , Pierre de Margerie, chief of the African and Eastern
affairs sub-department in the ministry of foreign affairs, remarked on the exten-
sive circulation of books and newspapers in the French colonies, especially the
high number of books published in Egypt by the ‘ulamā and students at Al-
Azhar in Cairo. These ﬁndings, in his opinion, ‘proved the extent of intellectual
contact that is maintained between the different countries of Islamic culture’.
French and British authorities persistently agonized over the supposed centri-
fugal inﬂuences exerted by Pan-Islamism. To counter them, ofﬁcials co-opted
local elites and fashioned conceptions of imperial sovereignty through
Islamic motifs and symbols. The press was central in these attempts to terri-
torialize Muslim identities as regimes turned out newspapers and journals in
native languages. By the turn of the century, Britain was funding several
Egyptian papers supportive of the pro-British Khedival government to
compete with newspapers backed by other regional powers. As the French pol-
itician Lucien Hubert wryly observed, ‘the Egyptian press was free only in its
legal formalities; the pens of its editors were the servants of others’. French
authorities could also not help but notice that many of the newspapers
 Gelvin and Green, ‘Introduction’, Global Muslims, pp. –.
 Khalid, ‘Pan-Islamism in practice’, pp. –.
 Edmund Burke, ‘Pan-Islamism and Moroccan resistance to French colonial penetration’,
Journal of African History,  (), pp. –.
 ANT, E , dossier –, ‘Note: Direction de la sureté publique’,  Nov. .
 ANT, E , dossier /, minister of foreign affairs to Alapetite,  July .
 David Motadel, ‘Islam and the European empires’, Historical Journal,  (), pp. –
; James McDougall, ‘The secular state’s Islamic empire: Muslim spaces and subjects of juris-
diction in Paris and Algiers, –’, Comparative Studies in Society and History,  (),
pp. –; Peter Hardy, The Muslims of British India (Cambridge, ).
 Lucien Hubert, L’Islam et la guerre (Paris, ), p. .
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published in Cairo and Alexandria were hostile to French interests in the
region, amounting to a veritable check against Britain’s primary imperial
rival. Yet while ofﬁcials deployed the local press to channel allegiances
toward imperial metropoles and cordon off populations from outside
inﬂuences, in some instances these attempts highlighted the extent to which
empires were enmeshed within trans-imperial webs of connection.
Given its sizeable presence in North Africa, France invested signiﬁcant
resources into nurturing an Arabo-Muslim press favourable to its imperial inter-
ests. It subsidized a number of newspapers in Egypt and the Near East, often
with the expectations that these papers would circulate back into Algeria and
Tunisia and reach their own colonial populations, thereby concealing the
hand of French ofﬁcialdom in their production. The administration also
ran its own Arabic language dailies in the colonies, drawing upon the expertise
of prominent orientalist scholars in France as well as an array of Ottoman
émigrés residing in Paris and abroad. The reliance upon Arab and particularly
Syrian Christian exiles in running colonial newspapers inﬂuenced the content
of the stories that appeared as many of the publicists were proponents of the
Arab cultural revival movement, or Nahda, coming of age during the
period. As Arab modernists from Egypt and the Levant were pressed into
the service of the colonial state, they helped transmit ideas of Arab identity
and culture to North African populations, establishing a Near East–
European–Maghreb transfer nexus that popularized themes of Arab nationality
and Islamic modernization. By the turn of the century, appeals to Arab nation-
ality and cultural revival expounded by Nahda proponents found a reception
among North African journalists such as Larbi Fékar and other Young
Algerians working through an independent Arab press. Fékar’s bilingual
El Misbah would proudly carry the banner ‘For France by Arabs’ on its masthead,
advertising its joint commitment to Arab modernization and imperial loyalty.
The irony of course was that in combatting the centrifugal inﬂuences of
Muslim cosmopolitanism and Ottoman Pan-Islamism, French authorities
became more reliant on trans-imperial networks and brokers like the Syrian
Christians. Imperial regime not only recognized the important role journals
and social networks played in the region; they equally utilized and supported
them, employing locals and émigrés across a public sphere that spanned
 ANT, E , dossier /, ‘Note: Secretariat général, bureau de la comptabilité’,  Feb.
.
 AMAE, Tunisie NS , ‘Note pour le minister’,  July .
 Alain Messaoudi, Les Arabisants en la France colonial, – (Paris, ), pp. –,
–; Rouchdi Fakkar, L’inﬂuence française sur la formation de la press littéraire en Égypte au XIXe
siècle (Paris, ).
 Khuri-Makdisi, The eastern Mediterranean, pp. –; Albert Hourani, The emergence of the
modern Middle East (Berkeley, CA, ), pp. –.
 El Misbah,  June . Also see Bénali El Hassar, Les jeunes Algériens et la mouvance moder-
niste au debut du XXème siècle: les frères Larbi and Bénali Fekar (Paris, ).
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empires. These currents were not simply a one-way channel either. As the
Ottoman and Egyptian regimes clamped down on liberal and radical reform
movements in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Arabs, Syrians, and
Turks ﬂed to Europe, creating exilic communities abroad that transformed
European capitals into centres of Muslim activism. During the s and
s, Young Ottoman exiles ran newspapers such as Hürriyet (London) and
Muhbir (Paris) that regularly commented upon political affairs in the
Ottoman Empire and promoted a brand of nascent Pan-Islamism critical of
the sultan. Ottoman authorities were wary of these foreign activities and
worked through diplomatic channels to shut them down. According to the
Ottoman ambassador in London, the Young Ottoman opposition was ‘encour-
aged by the impunity which they believe themselves assured of in England’, and
requested George Villiers, then foreign secretary, to take action ‘with all the
force of the law’. By the time the government acted, the publishers had
ﬂed the country and relocated to Paris. In the coming decades, the French
capital became an epicentre for Ottoman periodicals reﬂecting a range of ideo-
logical positions. Journals like L’Abeille du Bosphore, Le Libéral Ottoman, and
Turquie Contemporaine brought Ottoman and Muslim politics directly into the
centre of Parisian political life. Papers debated issues relevant to Islamic govern-
ance, Pan-Islamism, and France’s role in the East. They lambasted enemies and
engaged in sparring matches with rival newspapers in their columns, generating
an Ottoman press war in the heart of the French empire. Istanbul also
attempted to shut down the Francophone Ottoman press, although French
courts proved less amenable than the British government to oblige these
requests.
Journalistic and political debates encouraged trans-border political organiza-
tions as well. In , a Turko-Syrian committee was formed in Paris headed by
leading émigrés like Khalil Ghanem, a Syrian Catholic and stalwart defender of
imperial decentralization and liberal Ottomanism. The committee soon
merged with the Paris-based Union and Progress movement organized by the
Young Turk activist Ahmet Riza and progressively established links with oppo-
nents of Abdülhamid in Egypt. When the Young Turk revolution erupted in
, Syrian émigrés once again came to the fore. Shukri Ghanem, brother
 Mohamed-Fehri Chelbi, ‘Les journaux arabes de Paris, –: étude historique et
sociologique’ (Ph.D. thesis, Université de Lille, ); Nikki E. Keddie, An Islamic response to
imperialism: political and religious writing of Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dın̄ al-Afghāni (Berkeley, CA, ),
pp. –; Abdul Azim Islahi, Economic thinking of Arab Muslim writers during the nineteenth century
(New York, NY, ), pp. –.
 Özcan, Pan-Islamism, p. .
 The National Archives, Kew (TNA), FO /, Ottoman Imperial Embassy in London
to the earl of Clarendon,  Jan. .
 TNA, FO /, note to A. F. O. Liddell,  Mar. .
 M. Şükrü Hanioğlu, The Young Turks in opposition (New York, NY, ), p. .
 Hasan Kayali, Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism and Islamism in the Ottoman
Empire, – (Berkeley, CA, ), pp. –.
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of Khalil, and Georges Samné, a Greek Melchite doctor from Damascus, set up
the Association des Amis de l’Orient in Paris to serve as an advocacy group for
Syrian and Lebanese emigrants. Armed with a newspaper, the organization
committed itself to promoting good relations between Europe and the new
Ottoman regime in order to ‘establish and maintain the intellectual patrie of
humanity between Orientals and Europe, and especially France’, as Samné
claimed. In November, Shukri went further and announced the creation of
an Ottoman League movement intended to steer the ongoing revolution
from abroad and promote a liberal brand of Ottomanism consistent with the
empire’s multi-ethnic and multi-confessional composition. ‘Some might ﬁnd
the creation of this Ottoman league in Paris strange, but nothing is more
justiﬁed than this choice’, he stated. ‘Paris is the crossroads of the world.’
Shukri had ambitions of establishing international sections or ‘sister leagues’
in America, Africa, and the Middle East which would draw together liberal patri-
ots to ‘instruct the people and prepare them for their new role’ as Ottoman citi-
zens. ‘Liguons-nous, liguons-nous donc is the song heard from Paris to Peru,
from Japan to Rome and across the two Americas’, Shukri wrote as he
chronicled the success of the league movement in early . The imagined
geography in which Shukri conceptualized the Young Turk revolution validates
Isa Blumi’s conviction that conceptions of Ottomanism did, indeed, ‘go global’
by the twentieth century.
Whether Shukri’s envisaged Ottoman Leagues sprouted up around the world
‘like mushrooms’ as he imagined is doubtful. Yet the political activities in Paris
that accompanied the Young Turk revolution were further proof of the broader
links connecting Europe, the Ottoman Empire, and the Mediterranean by the
early twentieth century. The reach and power of modern print media gave
movements such as Pan-Islamism and Ottomanism a broad saliency, rendering
them trans-imperial in scope. Through these ideologies, imperial agents, refor-
mers, and émigré communities repurposed older social and religious networks
or created new ones to facilitate cross-border political activism. In doing so,
their activities linked metropoles and colonial peripheries in new ways, fre-
quently defying the simple space prescribed by imperial jurisdiction to expose
the entanglements that mutually abetted and destabilized imperial sovereignty.
 Martin Thomas, ‘Information and intelligence collection among imperial subjects
abroad’, in The French Colonial Mind: Mental Maps of Empire and Colonial Encounters ( vols.,
Lincoln, NA, ), I, p. .

‘France et Turquie’, Correspondance d’Orient,  Nov. , p. .
 Chékri Ganem, ‘Une Ligue Ottomane’, Correspondance d’Orient,  Nov. , p. .

‘Appel aux Ottomans’, Correspondance d’Orient,  Nov. , p. .
 Chékri Ganem, ‘Macédonie’, Correspondance d’Orient,  Jan. , p. .
 Isa Blumi, ‘Reorienting European imperialism: how Ottomanism went global’, Die Welt des
Islams,  (), pp. –.
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As the Ottoman League movement suggested, trans-imperial currents had the
potential to feed into forms of trans-politics enabled by a public sphere that
broadened the ﬁeld of political action for those operating between empires.
This phenomenon became more pronounced in the years after the Young
Turk revolution as a series of crises erupted throughout the Mediterranean
region. France’s creeping expansion into Morocco in the early twentieth
century provoked local revolts and encouraged the Moroccan sultanate to
solicit foreign aid for the purposes of anti-colonial resistance. The Italian inva-
sion of Ottoman Cyrenaica and Tripolitania (soon to be dubbed Libya) and the
ensuing Balkans Wars further destabilized the region, generating a humanitar-
ian crisis that invigorated Pan-Islamic sympathies and solidarities on a global
scale. These theatres of action provided a context in which cross-border political
movements and ideologies ﬂourished.
In this environment, Ottoman personnel purged from the military after the
Young Turk revolution found a new calling as mercenaries and freelance mili-
tary advisers to sovereigns in need of military assistance. In , ‘Aarif Tahir,
an ofﬁcer recently exiled to Egypt by the Committee of Union and Progress
(CUP) for his participation in political demonstrations against the government,
answered the call for foreign ﬁghters in Morocco and led an unofﬁcial military
mission to assist in training native Moroccan forces. The Moroccan sultan sum-
marily dismissed Tahir and his men under pressure from France, but members
of the team remained in the country and maintained communication with ex-
ofﬁcers in Cairo. During his brief tenure in Morocco, Tahir assisted in creat-
ing a Pan-Islamic youth group (Young Maghrib) and upon his return to Egypt
played a vital role in organizing North African students. French authorities
watched with alarm as students in Tunis began forming secret societies and
noted the evident parallels these had with the activities of Maghrebi students
residing at Al-Azhar. As the diplomatic chargé François Charles-Roux remarked
in , ‘Even when they are not explicitly co-ordinating, the intelligence
coming to me from different sources attests to a recrudescence of the Pan-
Islamic movements in Cairo at present, especially among Muslims coming
from the Maghreb.’
In Cairo, students, prominent journalists, and itinerant military men like
Tahir came together to form the Maghreb Unity Society (al-Ittihād
al-Maghribı)̄. Assembled amid the Italian invasion of Tripolitania and
Cyrenaica in , the society organized recruitment drives and dispatched
ﬁghters to the Moroccan and Libyan fronts. Its anti-colonial activities fed into
 Burke, ‘Pan-Islamism’, pp. –; Olide Moreau, ‘Aref Taher Bey: an Ottoman military
instructor bridging the Maghreb and the Ottoman Mediterranean’, in Olide Moreau and
Stuart Schaar, eds., Subversives and mavericks in the Muslim Mediterranean: a subaltern history
(Austin, TX, ), pp. –.
 ANT, E , dossier /, Charles Roux to Stephen Pichon,  Oct. .
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broader Pan-Islamic journalistic and political networks, revealing the widening
sphere of political activism provoked by the Libyan crisis. In the summer of
, a French civil controller outside Tunis noted the surge in Pan-Islamic
propaganda stemming from the Italian–Ottoman war raging in the east. ‘The
inhabitants are convinced that the issue of this war will be favourable to their
coreligionists and that Italy cannot hold out against them’, he reported. ‘All
their sympathies go to the contingents that are struggling against the
Italians.’ It did not help that North African émigrés were actively mobilizing
public opinion across borders. The Central Committee for the Society of
Algerian and Tunisian émigrés set up in Istanbul made an open appeal for
Muslims to boycott the Italians and apply pressure on the European powers
to condemn the occupation. That the violence in Libya might spill over
into Tunisia where a large Italian population lived alongside Muslims was not
unthinkable, threatening to draw French North Africa into the regional
instability.
Newspapers read by Italian émigré communities in Egypt, Tunisia, and
Algeria bolstered nationalist sentiments in favour of Italy’s imperial gambit.
Corrado Masi, Tunis resident and editor of the popular newspaper L’Unione,
played a central role in inciting Italian settlers in Tunisia to action and fuelling
Italian–Muslim communitarian tensions that erupted in street brawls and vio-
lence. French authorities were later convinced that Masi was in the pay of
the Italian political bureau in Tripolitania and that his émigré newspaper was
an organ of the Italian government in the French colony. Tunisian Muslims
did not remain passive, and French journalists balked at displays of Muslim pol-
itical activism, complaining of the growing ‘turkophile’ tendencies in the
colony. ‘For the last few years we have permitted a Young Turk party with the
aim of Islamic unity to establish itself and prosper in Tunisia’, protested one
journalist. These reactionary explanations ﬂagrantly discounted the emotive
response of Muslims who followed the Italian invasion in the press or within
their local communities. ‘In Tunisia, as well as almost everywhere, the current
war impacted Muslims emotionally’, claimed the Young Tunisian reformer Ali
Bash Hamba. ‘Could anyone, in all justice, ask us to remain impassive before
the massacre of our Tripolitanian brothers?’
The Ottomans capitalized on the emotional resonance triggered by the
Italian invasion to ﬁght the war. They allied with the Sanusiyya Suﬁ order
entrenched in Cyrenaica to recruit local resistance ﬁghters and mobilized
foreign ﬁghters coming from Africa and Asia through appeals to Pan-Islamic
 Christelow, Algerians without borders, p. .
 ANT, E , dossier /, Le contrôleur civil de Grombalia to Alapetite,  June .

‘L’agitation islamique’, Le Temps,  Oct. .

‘Entre Arabes et Italiens’, La Tunisie Française,  Nov. .
 Archives Diplomatiques, Nantes, TU//V/, ‘Note: sûreté publique’,  Dec. .
 Valmeroux, ‘La manifestation Turcophile’, La Tunisie Française,  Feb. .

‘Lettre de M. Back Hamba’, Le Temps,  Apr. .
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solidarity and jihad. If Ottoman Pan-Islamism had previously been oriented
toward ideas of inter-imperial peace and Islamic modernization, the Libyan
and Balkan conﬂicts between  and  infused Pan-Islamic rhetoric
with a marked anti-Western and militant element. Shakib Arslan, a Syrian
Arab and committed Pan-Islamic Ottomanist, explicitly saw the conﬂict as an
opportunity to rally the Muslim community around the Caliphate and against
European imperialism, and took a leading role in publicizing its importance
as a patriotic struggle against Western domination. ‘We will defend our father-
land, hoping that our efforts will increase the self-conﬁdence of Islam and
attract martyrs to its cause’, he asserted in . Muslim organizations
across the globe staged protests and anti-Italian demonstrations in support of
the Ottoman Empire. ‘There is no Mohammedan in this world today who
could say that he has not a very deep pain in his heart through this uncivilized
action of Italy against Turkey’, a statement drafted by Muslims in Cape Town
explained upon hearing the news. The experience of Muhammad Wali
Khan, a journalist from Peshawar, testiﬁed to the power such rhetoric had on
the imagination and its ability to mobilize support across borders. In ,
Wali Khan travelled through Tripoli, Istanbul, and Egypt as a war correspond-
ent for the Indian press. In Cyrenaica, he took up arms against the Italians
and the following year arrived home with the intention of recruiting ﬁghters
and returning to Benghazi. His plans never materialized as he became involved
in organizing an Ottoman relief fund and setting up a ‘Muslim club’ in his
native Peshawar. British authorities monitored Wali Khan with trepidation,
noting that his experience abroad had radicalized his political outlooks and
made him ‘addicted to speaking against the English and Europeans’. His ambi-
tion was to create ‘a Muhammadan republic embracing the whole of the
Muhammadan world’, he claimed. Only the Islamic Caliphate could
provide this unity, he believed, demanding that ‘the Islamic world must assist
Turkey and help to maintain her prestige among the nations of the earth’.
Muhammad Wali Khan was only one of many Muslim writers and activists to
answer the call for international support coming from Libya and the Balkans. A
report drafted for the Indian Ofﬁce in March  attested to the growing
number of Indians residing in Cairo and insisted that upon returning home
these individuals would harbour strong pro-Ottoman sympathies that might
 Lisa Anderson, The state and social transformation in Tunisia and Libya, –
(Princeton, NJ, ), pp. –.
 Aydin, The Muslim world, pp. –.
 William L. Cleveland, Islam against the West: Shakib Arslan and the campaign for Islamic nation-
alism (Austin, TX, ), p. .

‘Cape Muslims and the war’, Cape Times Weekly Addition ( Oct. ), p. .
 India Ofﬁce Records (IOR)/L/PS// (P/), Kitchener to E. Grey,  Feb.
.
 IOR/L/PS// (P/), ‘Criminal Intelligence Ofﬁce: history sheet of Qazi
Andul Wali Khan up to May ’, pp. –.
 IOR/L/PS// (P/), Kitchener to E. Grey,  Feb. .
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compromise British control in the Raj. ‘The defeat that Turkey suffered these
last three years at the hands of the European powers stirred up in the hearts
of Indian Moslems a strong hatred to Europeans and increased their love for
Turkey’, the report concluded. The same was true of Maghrebi, Syrian, and
Egyptian activists who similarly took up pen and arms against the latest manifest-
ation of Western imperial aggression and appealed to an imagined inter-
national Muslim community to resist. As the Ottomans came to rely on
mobilizing Muslims for reasons of defence, it was evident that this new militar-
ized environment provided opportunities for trans-border political organiza-
tion and radicalization. While commanding Ottoman forces in Libya and the
Balkans, the general Enver Pasa̧ co-ordinated efforts with local powerbrokers
like Ahmad al-Sharif al-Sanusi and liaised with local volunteers and Pan-Islamic
activists. In the coming year, he would amalgamate these informal networks
and revolutionary groups into the Tesķilat-i Mahsusa, a covert paramilitary and
intelligence agency maintained by the CUP with cells in Africa and the Middle
East. These networks would subsequently be deployed during the First World
War as part of the unsuccessful Ottoman war strategy to foment anti-colonial
jihad within the Entente empires.
If the Libyan war brought into sharp relief a new constellation of trans-polit-
ical solidarities fused together through jihadist ideology, the conﬂict itself
served to reconceptualize the very meaning of jihad. As Ahmad al-Sharif al-
Sanusi assumed leadership of the Bedouin tribes of Cyrenaica in , he
was urged to use his spiritual clout to attract foreign support for the defence.
To this end, he published The desire of the helper, a pamphlet laying out theoret-
ical arguments for jihad and the obligations of the mujāhid. Written in the
context of the ongoing war, Desire of the helper recounted legal and scriptural jus-
tiﬁcations for religious duties, arguing it was permissible for Muslims to wage
‘jihad with money’ and fulﬁl their obligations by funding the war effort and
associated charitable causes. Al-Sharif even invoked Shaﬁ’i legal precedent,
despite his afﬁliation with Mālikite Islamic rites, insisting rulers could impose
taxes and borrow money from inﬁdels to fund jihad if necessary. In no uncer-
tain terms, al-Sharif’s prescriptions sought to change the context of jihad in
order to enlist the efforts of the broader Muslim community beyond Libya
and North Africa.
The conﬂicts in the eastern Mediterranean spurred independent and semi-
ofﬁcial Islamic charitable and care networks into action. The Red Crescent
Society, created in  and reconstituted in , was deployed by the
Ottoman state as an auxiliary to the medical units of the Ottoman army and
 IOR/L/PS// (P/), ‘Notes on the Panislamic movement and its effect on
political agitation in India’,  Mar. , pp. –.
 Moreau, ‘Aref Taher Bey’, pp. –.
 Knut S. Vikør, ‘Religious revolts in colonial North Africa’, in David Motadel, ed., Islam and
the European empires (Oxford, ), pp. –.
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navy. It ran ﬁeld hospitals for the wounded and bolstered Ottoman patriotism as
medical professionals and public servants demonstrated their service to the
Ottoman nation (vatan) and Muslim community. Between  and ,
various Islamic organizations were set up to facilitate co-operation and aid-
related activities, among them the Benevolent Society of Islam (Cemiyet-i
Hayriye-yi Islamiye) centred in the Ottoman Empire. Prominent international
activists such as Shakib Arslan, Salih al-Sharif Tunisi, Said Halim Pasa̧, and
Abd al-Aziz Shawish were all associated with it. The organization would serve
as a conduit for Pan-Islamic mobilization during the First World War, and it
was therefore not surprising that many of its members were leading
Ottomanist publicists with close ties to the CUP leadership and secret service.
War also elicited sympathetic outpourings of support from imperial subjects
who continued to profess loyalty to European colonial governments. Algerians
and Tunisians organized charitable collections for the wounded, with journal-
ists urging co-religionists to donate to the Red Crescent and help their suffering
brethren. ‘The élan of charity which has manifested itself in Muslim countries
in favour of our brothers, victims of the Tripolitanian events, imposes upon us a
duty to call upon the noble sentiments of the colony to alleviate the long mar-
tyrdom of those who are suffering’, the editors of L’Islam, an organ of the emer-
gent Young Algerian movement, stated. Themes of martyrdom and sacriﬁce
prevalent to jihadist rhetoric were reinterpreted to accommodate colonial loy-
alties and expressions of public support. Benali Fékar, an Algerian residing in
Lyon, commended the strong demonstration of ‘Muslim solidarity’ that had
come forth in his native Tlemcen for the victims of the Libyan war, noting
‘the population has bled itself white in assisting the Ottoman wounded!’ In
total, the Algerian subscription campaign raised , francs (roughly $.
million today) with separate funding campaigns run by Algerians in Tunisia
and the M’zab. Indian fundraising was even more impressive. Between
 and , donations to the Ottoman Red Crescent raised roughly
£, (over $ million in today’s value). As Zafar Ali Khan, the
pioneer of Urdu journalism, stated in early , ‘The great living heart of
Islam in India has been stirred to its innermost depths as it has never been
 Ibrahim Basa̧ğaoğlu and Adnan Ataç, ‘Activities of the Ottoman Hilal-i Ahmer (Red
Crescent) Association in the Ottoman–Italian War (–)’, Marmara Medical Journal,
 (), pp. –; Nadir Özbek, ‘Deﬁning the public sphere during the late Ottoman
Empire: war, mass mobilization and the Young Turk regime (–)’, Middle Eastern
Studies,  (), p. .
 Aydin, Politics of anti-Westernism, p. .

‘Pour les blessés turcs’, L’Echo du Bourgie,  Mar. .

‘Souscription au proﬁt des blesses victims du conﬂit Italo-Turc’, L’Islam,  Feb. .
 Benali Fékar, ‘Notre loyalisme’, L’Islam,  Feb. .
 Christelow, Algerians across borders, p. .
 Michael O’Sullivan, ‘Pan-Islamic bonds and interest: Ottoman bonds, Red Crescent
remittances and the limits of Indian Muslim capital, –’, Indian Economic and Social
History Review,  (), p. .
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stirred before.’ With the outbreak of the Balkan Wars, Indian doctors and
journalists formed their own Red Crescent Society and led a medical mission
to run ﬁeld hospitals on the frontlines. The India Ofﬁce characteristically
viewed these activities with suspicion, seeing humanitarian activism as a cover
for international political organization. ‘Almost every Indian who [visits]
Constantinople [goes] back to his country fully prepared to serve the Turks
by helping to spread the principles of Panislamism’, the memo claimed.
Such accusations failed to recognize the ideological lure of Muslim unity and
its trans-imperial orientation as Indians came to project their own anxieties and
aspirations onto the Ottoman Empire and Caliphate. Nor did they accurately
convey the regional and even global dimensions of Pan-Islamic humanitarian-
ism at the turn of the century. Charitable remittances were often sizeable and
their collection and transfer required knowledge of international ﬁnances as
well as access to international banking institutions run by European ﬁrms. As
Michael O’Sullivan has shown in his study of India, the participation of local
merchant elites, consular intermediaries, and journalists was all essential to
managing the ‘religious and ﬁnancial economy of Pan-Islamism’. A host of
intertwining ﬁnancial and social networks cutting across Asia, the Middle
East, and Europe connected the isolated village to the larger Muslim commu-
nity, demonstrating that Pan-Islamic humanitarianism was actualized through
the structures of imperial governance and global ﬁnance.
Studies highlighting the importance of the eastern Mediterranean in the
origins of rights-based and minority humanitarian campaigns have chieﬂy
focused on European responses to Ottoman ‘atrocities’ against Christian popu-
lations. The efforts of Muslim activists hint at the broader regional implica-
tions for histories of humanitarianism as well as the non-European contexts
that fostered them. More speciﬁcally, humanitarian efforts engaged groups
and individuals outside of traditional state bureaucracies and religious charities,
signalling the rise of trans-imperial and non-governmental networks that were
made possible through the Muslim press and public activism. These
 Zafar Ali Khan, ‘The struggle in the Near East and the Muslim feeling in India’, Islamic
Review,  (), p. .
 Syed Tanvir Wasti, ‘The Indian Red Crescent mission to the Balkan Wars’, Middle Eastern
Studies,  (), pp. –.
 IOR/L/PS// (P/), ‘Notes on the Panislamic movement and its effect on
political agitation in India’ ( Mar. ), p. .
 Takashi Oishi, ‘An enquiry into the structures of Pan-Islamism in India: the phase of the
Italo-Turkish and Balkan Wars, –’, Minamiajiakenkyu,  (), pp. –; Özcan,
Pan-Islamism.
 O’Sullivan, ‘Pan-Islamic bonds and interest’, pp. –.
 Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s battle: the origins of humanitarian intervention (New York, NY, );
Davide Rodogno, Against massacre: humanitarian intervention in the Ottoman Empire, –
(Princeton, NJ, ).
 For efforts to rethink histories of humanitarianism, see Abigail Green, ‘Humanitarianism
in nineteenth-century context: religious, gender, national’, Historical Journal,  (),
pp. –.
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undertakings indicate a shift toward the ‘organized compassion’ associated with
modern humanitarianism as publics took part in subscription campaigns and
aided fellow Muslims across borders. They also indicated the extent to
which the Libyan war and the trans-political movements it encouraged were
coming to crystallize cross-border solidarities rooted in emotional and real rela-
tionships forged in the crucible of a militarized humanitarian crisis.
V
By the eve of the First World War, the loose-knit and mobile world of the Muslim
Mediterranean looked different than it had a century before. The trans-local
religious institutions and social bonds that had once characterized Muslim soci-
eties in the region had acquired novel political and cultural meanings as imper-
ial politics, modern forms of media, and global ﬁnancial institutions
transformed established networks and generated new ﬂows that both altered
communities and created new social constellations. In the years ahead, political
actors in the region would increasingly seek to instrumentalize these trans-
imperial ﬂows as militarized conﬂict and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire
tied the Mediterranean more closely to the rhythms of Europe’s global
empires.
Empire-building created – or rather sought to impose – a new spatial order
on the Muslim Mediterranean. In consolidating their power, imperial states
endeavoured to assert control over communities that were decentred and con-
nected through various forms of cultural and commercial activity. Certainly, the
imposition of empire generated ruptures in these relations, but it also exposed
continuities as well. The continued movement of people and ideas across famil-
iar geographies revealed the ﬂuidity of nineteenth-century imperial formations
even as states attempted to impose control from above and solidify their respect-
ive imperial dominions. Empire was never bound within the ‘simple’ space pre-
scribed by the European imperial imagination. Imperial states were persistently
subject to the push and pull of outside regional forces, and even attempted to
harness these forces for their own ends when possible. No doubt, a certain irony
becomes evident. In the search to consolidate empire, imperialists came to
utilize the very dynamics from below that threatened to destabilize the imperial
ediﬁce and erode the ‘hard’ borders of imperial jurisdiction.
Examining the connected histories of empire can help us analyse the inner
workings of these complex processes, highlighting the ways in which cross-
border phenomena shaped and complicated practices of modern state-building.
 Keith David Watenpaugh, Bread from stones: the Middle East and the making of modern
humanitarianism (Berkeley, CA, ), pp. –, .
 Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, The First World War in the Middle East (Oxford, ); Sean
McMeekin, Berlin–Baghdad Express: the Ottoman Empire and Germany’s bid for world power, –
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As a category of historical analysis, empire traverses multiple contexts ranging
from the local to the global, often drawing them together in interesting conﬁ-
gurations.Deviating from a strict metropole–periphery model presents oppor-
tunities to consider how local and regional entanglements connect a plurality of
locations, how these connections can foster new cultural and political discourses,
and ultimately how they can unsettle or reconﬁgure established spatial imagin-
aries. This conclusion is no less relevant today as a post-imperial Europe
debates issues pertaining to migration, security, and Islamic trans-politics stem-
ming from the Mediterranean region. Syria and Libya are once again sites
of trans-political ferment that have raised questions surrounding migration pol-
icies and the ability of states to monitor and control borders. Examinations of
the Mediterranean in a trans-imperial framework provide an historic backdrop
against which ongoing processes of jurisdictional authority and cross-border com-
munitarian ties can be analysed and assessed. In a broader context, it underscores
both the tensions and dialogic relationships that have historically bound Europe
to Africa and Asia, situating the Mediterranean at the nexus of larger regional
and global inﬂuences that have yet to run their course.
 Simon J. Potter and Jonathan Saha, ‘Global history, imperial history and connected his-
tories of empire’, Journal of Colonialism and Colonial History,  (), n.p.
 Marium Haleh Davis and Thomas Serres, eds., North Africa and the making of Europe: gov-
ernance, institutions and culture (London, ).
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